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Abstract: This article addresses the issue of both the task and significance of philosophical reflection 
on the relation of the finite to the infinite after Kant, with particular reference to Husserl, Heidegger 
and Schleiermacher. It argues that (1) whilst both Husserl and Heidegger, in their respective 
phenomenological philosophies of experience, do philosophize in the wake of the Kantian critique 
of traditional metaphysics, there is, however,  (2) a rich source of untapped potential for critically 
assessing and contesting both Husserl and Heidegger‘s respective philosophies of experience and 
their competing conceptions of ‗first philosophy‘ (as infinite reflection on essences in ‗intentional 
consciousness‘ or as the search for a ‗fundamental ontology‘ grounded in finitude) in 
Schleiermacher‘s earlier recognition and reflections on the relation of the finite to the infinite in 
‗religious self-consciousness‘ which, in turn, enables an advancement of philosophical reflection on 
the relation of the finite to the infinite after Husserl, after Heidegger, and after Kant too. 
 
 
 
        INTRODUCTION 
 
Though Kant is, perhaps, most famous for his demolition of all arguments for the 
existence of God and for, in particular, his rejection of the epistemological 
legitimacy of any purported knowledge-claims about the existence of God, 
philosophical speculation on the nature of the relation of the finite to the infinite 
after Kant was far from dampened; it intensified, rather, as is evidenced in the 
writings of so many of his immediate followers and successors of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, such as, for instance, in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and 
Kierkegaard.1 This particular task of reflection on the relation between the existence 
of a human being‘s consciousness of that being‘s self and the existence of God was 
silenced, however, quite definitively in two of the most influential 
 
1 Kant was not unaware himself of the significance which his own particular religious belief played in 
his own intellectual motivation for determining the limits to human knowledge in his Critique of Pure 
Reason, for, as he explicitly informs his reader in the 1787 Preface to the second edition of his 
Critique, ‗I had to deny knowledge [of the existence of God] in order to make room for faith [in 
God].‘ Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), BXXX, p. 117. It is of course true, as many 
commentators point out, that the theory of knowledge which Kant elaborates and defends in the 
Critique excludes in itself the legitimacy of philosophical reflection on topics addressed in traditional 
metaphysics, such as, for instance, the existence of God, the question of the continued existence of 
the human soul after death and the possibility of life with God in the next life, but not all 
commentators give due attention to either the religious reasons motivating Kant‘s attack on 
transcendental arguments in metaphysics for the existence of God or the issue of what role and 
significance religious faith plays in Kant‘s entire approach to both philosophy and religion.  
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phenomenological philosophies of human experience that were elaborated in the 
early decades of the 20th century, first by Husserl in the First Book of Ideas Pertaining 
to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (published in 1913)2 and 
then, secondly, by Heidegger in Being and Time (1927),3 both of whom, nevertheless, 
claiming steadfast adherence, despite major differences in their respective 
conceptions of phenomenology, to the manner of thinking inspired by Kant. In 
what follows, I would like to argue that whilst both Husserl and Heidegger do 
philosophize in the wake of Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason, Schleiermacher‘s earlier 
recognition and reflections on the relation of the finite to the infinite in ‗religious 
self-consciousness‘ contains possibilities for a radical critical evaluation of both 
Husserl and Heidegger‘s respective understandings of ‗first philosophy‘ and their 
respective post-Kantian phenomenological philosophies of experience.4  
This article, then, addresses the issue of the task and significance of 
philosophical reflection on the relation of the finite to the infinite after Kant, in 
Husserl, Heidegger and Schleiermacher. It is divided into three sections. The first 
section focuses attention on the philosophical reasons that Husserl gives in Ideas I 
(1913) for his exclusion of the question of the existence of God and of the relation 
of God to human self-consciousness in his establishment of phenomenology as an 
infinite task of reflection on the essential features of intentional consciousness and 
its objectivities.5 The second section examines Heidegger‘s implicit critique in Being 
 
2 See, Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First 
Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1982); Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, 
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913); Husserliana Vol. III/ 1 & III/ 
2 ed. by Karl Schumann (1977, 1995). Henceforth, abbreviated as Ideas I, with Kersten‘s English 
translation‘s pagination of Ideas I preceding the original‘s, separated by a colon. See, esp., Ideas I, ‗§58. 
The Transcendency, God, Excluded,‘ pp. 133–134:110–111. 
3 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962, 2000); Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957), also, published in separate 
printing in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. by Edmund Husserl, Vol. 8 
(1927), 1–438.  
4 Though Kant‘s provision of formidable logical, metaphysical and epistemological arguments 
against any attempt to prove God‘s existence are well known, and re-iterated by commentators and 
his followers, his expressly religious reasons receive much less attention, or are simply left out of 
consideration. These religious reasons, nonetheless, are of central significance to his entire effort in 
the Critique of securing a content for reason itself outside of those religious reasons announced in the 
Preface to the second edition. This is as true for a-theistic followers of Kant, as much as it is of his 
theistic followers (e.g. Kierkegaard), for, as Husserl acutely notes, in line with Kant, ‗(T)he idea of 
God is a necessary limiting concept in epistemological considerations, and an indispensable index to 
the construction of certain limiting concepts which not even the [post-Kantian] philosophizing 
atheist [or theist] can do without‘. Ideas I, p. 187:147, n. 17. That Kant‘s position supports atheistic 
conceptions of philosophy, however, cannot be denied either. See, Gordon E. Michalson, Kant and 
the Problem of God (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999). Thanks to the reviewer for this latter 
reference. 
5 Central to Husserl‘s conception of phenomenology is his concentration on the intentionality of 
consciousness. Husserl credits his teacher, Franz Brentano, for the discovery of this tenet in modern 
philosophy. See, Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, 
Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1968), Vol. IX, ed. by Walter Biemel, esp., ‗§ 3d 
Brentano als Wegbereiter für die Forschung in innerer Erfahrung — Enkdeckung der Intentionalität 
als Grundcharakter des Psychischen‘, 31–5; Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, 
trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), ‗Section (d) Brentano as pioneer for 
research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the 
psychic‘, pp. 23–7. That consciousness is always a consciousness of something is what the tenet 
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and Time (1927) of that infinite task, and his famous attempt to think the finite from 
within the particular experience of finitude itself. Why this is a continuation of 
Husserlian phenomenology — even if Husserl himself came to the conclusion that, 
as it appeared to him, it was not, but, on the contrary, a complete rejection of 
everything that his idea of phenomenology stood for —6  needs to be understood 
first, before any proper evaluation of Heidegger‘s position in philosophy in general 
and in phenomenology in particular can be undertaken. In the third and final 
section of this article, I would like to return briefly to Schleiermacher‘s previous 
attempt, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, to think the finite and the 
infinite together in what he calls ‗immediate religious self-consciousness‘ in his essay 
On Religion: Addresses in Response to its Cultured Despisers (1799–1800; 1806; 1821)7 and 
with some reference to his work The Christian Faith (1821–22, 1830–31).8  
Schleiermacher‘s position is of both historical and philosophical pertinence to our 
concerns for two distinct but related reasons. Firstly, it breaks the embargo that 
some believed Kant had both successfully and conclusively put on the legitimacy of 
any philosophical reflection on the significance of the relation of the self to the 
existence of God, after the publication of his Critique. Secondly, it re-opens the task 
and significance of philosophical reflection on the relation of the finite to the 
infinite in human experience that had been silenced by Husserl and Heidegger in 
their respective post-Kantian philosophical phenomenologies. We can of course, as 
Kant and his followers maintain, try to order our experiences and seek to find order 
in those experiences, but we cannot call our experiences to order. If, therefore, 
there is an experience of the infinite that is not called to order, but which is there to 
be found in human experience itself, then that too, contrary to what Husserl and 
Heidegger stipulate, must form at least an essential part of a post-Kantian 
 
holds, but there are many versions, interpretations and disputes still surrounding both the meaning 
and the validity of this tenet. For an extensive and meticulous examination of this theme, from its 
first appearance in Husserl‘s thought in his  earliest writings up to and including Ideas I, see Theodore 
De Boer‘s excellent study, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978). 
6 Whereas many at the time in the 1920s were well aware of Heidegger‘s attack on Husserl‘s idea of 
phenomenology, it took Husserl a considerable amount of time to realise just how antagonistic 
Heidegger‘s conception of phenomenology was to his own, for, as he tells Alexander Pfänder, in a 
letter which he wrote to him on January 6 1931, ‗(I)n order to come to a clear-headed and definitive 
position on Heideggerean philosophy, I devoted two months to studying Being and Time, as well as 
his more recent writings. I arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I have nothing to 
do with this Heideggerean profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius; that Heidegger‘s 
criticism [of my work], both open and veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding [of my work]; 
that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always 
considered my life‘s work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a 
long time.‘ Edmund Husserl, ‗Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931‘, in Edmund Husserl, 
Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–193I): The 
‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’ Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’ and Husserl’s 
Marginal Notes in ‘Being and Time’ and ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’, trans. and ed. by Thomas 
Sheehan & Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997), p. 482. We cannot infer 
from this, nonetheless, that Husserl‘s philosophy did not have a significant influence on Heidegger‘s 
thinking, but the relation of Husserl‘s manner of thinking to Heidegger‘s philosophy is exceedingly 
complex, intricate and controversial, and outside the limits of this present article to address in detail. 
7 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. by Richard Crouter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
8 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. by H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Steward 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1976). 
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phenomenological conception of philosophy that finds its locus in the experiencing 
subject.9 In this regard, Schleiermacher‘s thinking, which likewise unfurls in the wake 
of the Kantian critique, contains a rich source of untapped potential for critically 
assessing the limits that are set on philosophy and phenomenology not only by 
Husserl and Heidegger but by Kant too; or, at least, so shall I argue in this article.10 
 
 
          I 
HUSSERL‘S EXCLUSION OF ‗GOD‘ FROM FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND 
 HIS DEFINITION OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A TASK OF  
INFINITE REFLECTION ON HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
 
In Ideas I Husserl draws attention to the incorrigible fact that in the immanent 
perception of an experience, we have apodictic certainty regarding knowledge of the 
 
9 Husserl was interested in exploring all aspects and dimensions of human experience, including 
ethical and religious experience, and had, in fact, appointed Adolf Reinach as his phenomenologist 
of religion in this regard, but Reinach died unexpectedly near the front lines in the First World War 
in 1917. Theodore Kisiel notes that in June of 1918 Husserl gave Heidegger access to Reinach‘s 
fragments on the phenomenology of religion (prepared by Edith Stein, then Husserl‘s assistant), 
which were composed by Reinach shortly before his death (The Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 75). Husserl, therefore, saw Heidegger as the 
person ‗to fill the gap left by Reinach‘s death‘, and, ‗1918 thus marks the year in which Husserl draws 
closer to Heidegger […] which ended in his [Husserl‘s] nomination of Heidegger as his 
―phenomenologist of religion‖ (letter to Heidegger on September 10‘ (ibid.). In this long letter that 
he wrote to Heidegger in1918, Husserl draws Heidegger‘s attention to Rudolf Otto‘s book on The 
Idea of the Holy, ‗which in fact is an attempt at a phenomenology of a person‘s consciousness of God‘, 
only to hint to Heidegger that he believes that Heidegger would do a much better job than Otto at 
pursuing this line in phenomenology and phenomenological research. ‗September 10, 1918: Edmund 
Husserl to Martin Heidegger‘, in Martin Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Occasional 
Writings, 1910–1927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2007), pp. 359–363 (360). The origins of Otto‘s ideas can be found in 
Schleiermacher‘s work. Heidegger was already acquainted with Schleiermacher‘s work and was able 
to recite, almost verbatim, Schleiermacher‘s Second Speech: On the Essence of Religion from his On 
Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, in his ‗impromptu talk‘ to Heinrich Ochsner, in August 1917. 
See editors‘ comments in Becoming Heidegger, ‗On Schleiermacher‘s Second Speech, ―On the Essence 
of Religion‖‘, pp. 86–88, and cf., p. 471, n. 1. See, also, Kisiel, Genesis, pp. 88–89, and pp. 112–15.  
10 Though reared a Roman Catholic, sometime between 1917–1919 Heidegger relinquished his 
affiliation to what he called ‗the system of Catholicism‘ (Kisiel, Genesis, p. 114), and began to 
associate his interests in philosophy more in line with thinkers from protestant background (e.g., 
Kant, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dilthey). See, Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, 
trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 1993), esp., Part Two The Struggle with the Faith 
of My Birth, The Break with the ‗System of Catholicism‘, pp. 106–121. Heidegger‘s reading of 
Schleiermacher around this time (1917 and ff.) would certainly shown Heidegger not only an 
alternative approach and different way to Husserl and to Kant but also a more positive option, after Kant, 
of pursuing philosophy of religious experience. Cf., Sean J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval 
Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2006), 
p. 127, n.13; ‗as early as 1917, Heidegger had reversed his 1916 position on the symbiosis of 
Scholasticism and mysticism‘ (ibid., p. 121); see, also, Heidegger‘s inclusion of Schleiermacher in his 
1919 lecture-courses (ibid., p. 131) and Heidegger‘s note in 1917, ‗Zu Schleiermachers zweiter Rede: 
Über das Wesen der Religion‘ (ibid., p. 142). Why Heidegger, therefore, rejects entirely Schleiermacher‘s 
attempt to think the finite and the infinite together that is deposited in religious experience and 
documented in the major religions of the world (McGrath, p. 143), and instead seeks to think the 
finite from within the experience of the finite alone in Being and Time, seems to me to be of major 
significance warranting critical philosophical attention.  
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existence of that experience.11 The non-existence of an experience immanently 
perceived is unthinkable, and it is unthinkable, for Husserl, ‗not in the subjective 
[psychological-factual] sense of an incapacity to represent-things-otherwise, but in 
the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise.‘12 Unlike an act of 
transcendent perception that occurs within consciousness, such as, for instance, an 
act of memory, which posits the existence of its object (a remembered item, for 
example) sometimes correctly and sometimes not so correctly, an act of immanent 
perception posits knowledge of the existence of its object, the current (conscious) 
experience (Sein als Erlebnis), without any shadow of doubt. Though limited strictly 
to the present, reflective immanent perception, nonetheless, is infallible in its 
guarantee of knowledge of the existence (die Existenz) of its object.13  
This implies, however, that for Husserl there is present in a reflective 
immanent perception an identifiable but discernible intuitive difference between the 
experience as lived and the experience as reflected upon, even though these two 
parts form one concrete cogitatio and one indissoluble  unity inherent in that 
perception.14 Talking about the experiencing of ‗a rejoicing at a course of theoretical 
thought which goes on freely and fruitfully‘ — here, as is evident from the context, 
Husserl is thinking of the delight that one takes in the discovery of an objective 
truth, such as, for instance, the truth of a mathematical proposition or of a 
mathematical theorem, the gaudium de veritate of Augustine — Husserl remarks, ‗we 
have the possibility of effecting a reflection on the reflection which objectivates the 
latter [= the reflective immanent perception] and of thus making even more 
effectively clear the difference between a rejoicing which is lived (erlebter), but not 
regarded, and a regarded (erblickter) rejoicing.‘15   ‗The first reflection on the rejoicing‘, 
 
11 ‗Every perception of something immanently perceived guarantees the existence (die Existenz) of its 
object. If reflective experience is directed towards my experience, I have seized something absolute 
in itself, the factual being (Dasein [not in Heidegger‘s sense of this term]) of which is essentially 
incapable of being negated, i.e., the insight that it is essentially impossible for it not to exist; it would 
be a countersense (ein Widersinn, a non-sense) to believe it possible that an experience given in that 
manner (so gegebenes) does not in truth exist‘. Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 96–97:85. 
12 ‗What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought — this equivalence fixes 
the differences between the pregnant notion of thinking and the ordinary subjective sense of 
presentation and thought. […]  Wherever therefore the word ―can‖ occurs in conjunction with the 
pregnant use of ―think‖, there is a reference, not to a subjective necessity, i.e. to the subjective 
incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise, but to the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-
otherwise.‘ Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by John N. Findlay (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1970; New York: Humanity Books, 2000), pp. 445–446;  Logische Untersuchungen. I. Teil: 
Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Halle, 1900), II. Teil:Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der 
Erkenntnis, In zwei Bänden (Halle, 1901); Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 
Volume XVIII, ed. by Elmar Holenstein (1975) and Volume XIX, ed. by Ursula Panzer (1984). 
13 That the very mode of being of that which that is given to our experiences is guaranteed on the 
basis of some identifiable, perceptually-founded act(s) is of crucial importance to Husserl‘s idea of a 
phenomenological philosophy because, otherwise, there would be no justification for any 
phenomenological approach to experience, as Husserl defines that approach. Not all of Husserl‘s so-
called followers, however, agreed with Husserl on this point. The act of reflective, immanent 
perception, nonetheless, is of primary importance to Husserl in that it guarantees, apodictically, the 
very existence of its object, namely, psychical-act experiences and their objects (if they exist). 
14 The perception of the experience in immanent perception and the experience itself are, therefore, 
non-independent parts of that particular experience. In this instance, as de Boer comments, ‗(T)he 
perception cannot be isolated from its object; it is a non-independent aspect of this unity‘ (p. 333).  
15 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 176:146. Following Descartes, Locke, Hume and Brentano (the descriptive 
psychologist), Husserl regards access to one‘s own consciousness as peculiarly direct and certain (in 
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Husserl notes, ‗finds it as actually present now, but not [Husserl emphasizes] as only 
now beginning. [Rather,] It is there as continuing [as Husserl also emphasizes] to endure, 
as already lived before, just not looked at.‘16 
Three things are of note here. Firstly, for Husserl, the ability of 
consciousness to engage in reflection on its own experiences does not bring such 
experiences into existence — their esse is not their percipi, as Berkeley would put it; 
for Husserl, rather, experiences are there, and exist, whether reflected upon, or not, 
and whether seen, or not.17  Secondly, Husserl is well aware of the fact that 
experiences are the kinds of things that cannot but be lived and cannot but be lived 
now, continuing in time, whether they are reflected upon, or not.18 Thirdly, and this 
is of most significance to Husserl, in any actual enactment of a reflective, immanent 
perception of an experience, a direct experiential understanding of ‗the living now 
of the experience (das lebendige Jetzt des Erlebnisses)‘ is ‗retrievable (wiederholbar)‘ and 
entertained by and in human consciousness itself.19   
It thus follows for Husserl that experiences are not inherently ‗phenomena‘ 
at all because they are not being seen automatically or concomitantly all the time in 
consciousness, as Brentano and his doctrine of ‗inner perception‘, following Locke‘s 
 
immanent perception) compared to anything else. This position, however, is premised on a dualistic 
metaphysics of human subjectivity regarding the existence of a lucid mind and an opaque body. Here  
is one place where later existential phenomenologists sought to correct Husserl‘s account of both the 
purity and the priority of ‗pure intentional consciousness‘ that he argued for and defended in his 
famous reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude in Ideas I, 
but this will not be addressed in this article.  
16 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 176:146. 
17 See, Ideas I, ‗§78. The Phenomenological Study of Reflections on Experiences,‘ pp. 177–181:147–
151. For Husserl, then, reflective immanent perception does bring knowledge of those experiences 
into existence. That these experiences exist, however, drops out of Husserl‘s fundamental 
consideration of phenomenology. Heidegger follows suit in excluding such a metaphysical issue in 
Being and Time, for, as he both asserts and stresses, ‗(E)ntities [Seiendes] are [i s t ], quite independently 
[unabhängig] of the experiences by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are 
discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But [the meaning of] Being ―is‖ 
[―ist‖] only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of 
Being [Seinsverständis] belongs.‘ (p. 228:183). (English translation‘s pagination of Being and Time 
precedes the original‘s, separated by a colon.) This issue concerning the very existence of experiences 
and the very existence of things that are (however the latter are to be understood, or grasped, or 
constituted in our human understanding) becomes a fundamental consideration in Emmanuel 
Levinas‘s work in phenomenology. See, E. Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. and ed. by 
Richard A. Cohen & Michael B. Smith (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998); truncated 
version of his, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1949; 2nd expanded ed., 
1967, 1974). 
18 Husserl was well aware of the fact that ‗time‘ was central to the determination of mode of ‗being 
of (conscious) experience‘ (Sein als Erlebnis), and that the ability of consciousness to reflect on 
anything whatsoever, including its own contents, presupposed a present-past-future immanent time-
structure to the being of our experiences but because he had to prove  that the particular kind of 
existence that is characteristic of psychical-act experiences cannot be reduced to thing-perception, he 
believes that he can postpone the issue of the relation between time and being in consciousness in 
Ideas I. See, de Boer, p. 332, n.1. Prior to the publication of Ideas I in 1913, Husserl had of course 
conducted serious philosophical reflections on this matter in his 1905 lecture-course on immanent 
time-consciousness at the University of Göttingen, which he had published much later, edited by 
Heidegger, with Edith Stein‘s help, in 1928. See, de Boer, pp. 462–463. 
19 Husserl, Ideas I, 179:149.  
 99  
hypothesis, would have us believe.20 On the contrary, more often than not 
experiences are not seen (for what they are), nor reflected upon; they are, rather, 
simply lived through (er-lebt). Experiences, nonetheless, are always, in principle, 
‗ready to be perceived‘ either in a glance of ‗straightforward reflection‘ or in 
‗reflective immanent perception‘ (which is what Husserl is really thinking of in 
particular, in his famous argument of the reduction of the natural attitude to the 
transcendental-phenomenological attitude).21 Unlike experiences that are in 
principle ready to be perceived, however, reflection on things given to outer 
perceptual-sense experience ‗is possible only in the ―background field‖ of my 
perception, which actually makes up only a small part of the ‗world around me‘ 
(Umwelt)‘.22 Thus, for Husserl, ‗the rest [of the world around me]‘, as de Boer points 
out, ‗is only perceivable via a long chain of perceptions.‘23 
Husserl notes, however, that the knowledge we can have of the unity 
pertaining to an act of reflective immanent perception and its object is distinctly 
different to the kind of knowledge that we also can have of the unity that 
characterizes ‗the stream of experiences‘ for reflection.24 This is of pivotal 
importance both to Husserl‘s line of argument and to his establishment of his 
conception of phenomenology. It is thus important not to confuse, or to mix up 
these two different kinds of unities in consciousness; otherwise, Husserl may appear 
to be somewhat less than clear than he evidently is and be accused of being 
somewhat confused regarding this matter himself which he evidently is not.25 
 
20 Husserl‘s main criticism of Brentano‘s and Locke‘s view of concomitant perceptions of psychical-
act experiences is that there is simply no evidence in our experience to support such a theory. See 
Husserl‘s explicit critique of Locke and Brentano‘s  understanding and definition of ‗consciousness 
as the perception of what goes on in a man‘s own mind‘, in the 1913 Appendix to the re-issue of the 
Logical Investigations, ‗External and Internal Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena‘, pp. 852–
869; Hua Band XIX/2, Beilage, ‗Äußere und innere Wahrnehmung. Physische und psychische 
Phänomene‘, pp. 751–775.  
21 ‗Every single experience, e.g., an experience of joy, can begin as well as end and hence delimit its 
duration. But the stream of experiences [for reflection] cannot begin and end. […] Belonging of 
necessity to this [ability of consciousness to reflect upon experiences] is the possibility (which, as we 
know, is no empty logical possibility) that the Ego directs its regard to this experience and seizes 
upon the experience [in reflective immanent perception] as actually existing or as enduring in 
phenomenological time [of the actual experience].‘ Ideas I, ‗§81. Phenomenological Time and 
Consciousness of Time,‘ p. 194:164.  
22 De Boer, p. 337. 
23 Ibid. The transcendence of the stream of experiences for reflection, therefore, is entirely different 
to the kind of transcendence that characterizes the mode of being of a thing given to acts of outer 
perceptual-sense experience. ‗Husserl‘, as de Boer also remarks, ‗already had made this point a 
number of times‘ (ibid.). 
24 See, Ideas I, ‗§83. ‗Seizing Upon the Unitary Stream of Experiences as ―Idea‖,‘ pp. 197–199:166–
167.  
25 In Ideas I, Husserl also famously compares the ‗outer sense perception‘ of a thing to the ‗immanent 
perception‘ of an experience. Because a thing is spatial in essence, given in adumbration and through 
perspectival variations, the perception of a thing is always, in principle, incomplete and open to 
further legitimating experiences of the same kind, that is to say, of outer perceptual-sense 
experiences of the thing itself. By comparison, the ‗immanent perception‘ of a currently lived 
experience is always, in principle, complete because it is not given through perspectival variations, or 
in adumbration, but absolutely. Husserl does not compare (or confuse) the incompleteness 
characteristic of thing-perception to the incompleteness characteristic of the idea of the infinity of 
reflection on acts, as one commentator suggests, when she comments, ‗(I)n immanent experience we 
are faced with an incompleteness that does not occlude the co-appearance of that which appears in 
its failure to appear, which in turn is fully present [i.e. the idea of infinity of such acts for reflection 
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Though experiences are ‗ready to be perceived‘, in any act of reflective 
immanent perception the whole ‗stream of experiences‘ of course cannot be known, 
for it is never perceived as a whole. The past and future parts of the stream are 
always unknown — and, ‗in this sense‘, as Husserl remarks, ‗transcendent‘.26 Yet it 
is precisely because we can never in principle embrace the whole stream of 
experience as a direct object of knowledge and thereby intuit its unity in an act of 
reflection that we have therein an insight into this never-ending possibility as such.27 
We can then see that reflection on ‗the stream of experiences‘ would continue 
endlessly, for ‗the stream of experience [for reflection] cannot begin and end‘.28 By 
comparison to the beginning and the end of an experience as lived, then, ‗[reflection 
on] the stream of experiences [as knowable items of knowledge] cannot [in principle] 
begin and end‘. It thus follows that recognition of the finiteness of the knowledge 
of an experience in an act of reflective immanent perception presupposes insight 
into the ideal-regulative possibility of infinite reflection on the content of that finite 
experience itself. In other words, we can justifiably deduce from the very finiteness of 
the knowledge of an experience, immanently perceived, the idea of the unity, 
totality and infinity of reflection on the existence of such experiences (if, and when 
they exist) for possible knowledge-claims. This transcendental deduction of the idea 
of the unity, totality and infinity of reflection on one‘s actual experiences by the 
intellectual (and not sense) imagination, Husserl assumes his Kantian readers will 
readily understand. Concerning the unity of the stream of experiences for reflection, 
Husserl writes and stresses, ‗(W)e do not seize upon it as we do [the unity of] a 
single experience [in reflective, immanent perception] but in the manner of an idea 
in the Kantian sense.‘29 
No matter how infinite in principle reflection on individual actual 
experiences ideally is, items of knowledge gained by means of reflection on the 
particularity of the facticity of individual experiences themselves does not and 
cannot lead to any science of such experiences, so argues Husserl. Reflection can only 
be scientific if general truths about the facticity of such experiences are obtainable and 
communicable for that science. If philosophy is a science — and for Husserl, 
following Brentano, philosophy is a science, or it is nothing at all — it must arrive 
at general truths about the facticity of such experiences that are unified and 
unifiable for that science.30 Such general truths, however, cannot be empirical 
generalisations about matters of fact because all knowledge-claims pertaining to 
matters of fact, so Husserl argues, again following Brentano, are the purview and 
 
transcendentally deduced]. In [reflective] immanent experience the infinite fulfilled stream of 
intentions is fully present despite the incompleteness of the adumbrating nature of lived experiences 
[i.e., that are characteristic of outer sense perceptions of things]‘. Lilian Alweiss, The Unclaimed World: 
A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2003), ‗§20. 
Limitations of Ideen I,‘ pp. 32–33 (p. 32). The deduction, on the basis of the recognition of the 
finiteness of any given act of reflection on an experience, of the idea of the infinity for reflection on 
experiences by the transcendental (intellectual, and not sense) imagination is of critical significance to 
Husserl‘s definition of ‗the infinite task‘ of phenomenology. Husserl appears to have been either 
greatly misunderstood or not understood at all in relation to this basic in his philosophy. 
26 See, De Boer, pp. 335–39. 
27 Ideas I, 166–7:197–8. See, De Boer, p. 334, n.5. 
28 Ideas I, 163:194. 
29 Ibid., p. 197:166. 
30 See, Husserl, ‗Introduction‘, to Logical Investigations, Vol. II, Part I of the German edition, ‗§7 
―Freedom from presuppositions‖ as a principle in epistemological investigation‘. 
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provenance of the natural sciences — and philosophy is not a natural science —31 
but eidetic-general truths about that which cannot be otherwise, i.e., eidetic-
ontological laws pertaining to (lived) experiences are obtainable. Only a descriptive-
eidetic manner of reflection can realize the possibility of philosophy as a universal 
science that is rigorously and phenomenologically legitimated.32 It will be, therefore, 
a strict methodological requirement for Husserl, in the elaboration of his idea of a new 
descriptive-eidetic-phenomenological science of experiences, to seek out only those 
universally determinable, essential features of experiences themselves, ignoring 
whatever contingencies there are pertaining to the facticity, temporality, historicity 
and idiosyncrasies of such experiences.33 This is why Husserl is led to the 
conclusion that phenomenology, in his eyes, can be defined as an eidetic science of 
intentional consciousness and its objectivities, after (human) consciousness has 
been purified of all naturalistic interpretations via the celebrated, intellectually-
therapeutic measure of transcendental reduction. 
 One of the central linchpins of Husserl‘s establishment of his version of 
Kantian transcendental idealism in Ideas I, nevertheless, is the actual ‗ontic‘ 
experience of a reflective, immanent perception. This particular experience yields a 
legitimate phenomenal basis upon which Husserl‘s transcendental deduction of the 
idea, in Kant‘s sense, of the infinity of reflective acts on experiences within inner 
reflection rests. No such similar, transcendental deduction, Husserl notes against 
Kant and against anyone else living in the natural attitude, is phenomenologically 
justifiable in relation to things given to outer perceptual-sense experience simply 
because things given to outer perceptual-sense experience can always, in principle, 
turn out to be other than what they actually are for the experiencing subject; but an 
 
31 Brentano never advocated the method of the natural sciences for the descriptive part of his new 
science of ‗descriptive psychology‘, which first emerged, albeit in embryonic form, in his unfinished 
study Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, published in 1874, and which he developed in his lecture-
courses on ‗Descriptive Psychology‘ at Vienna University in the late 1880s and early 1890s. He 
advocated, instead, ‗inner perception‘, or, more accurately stated, the ability of consciousness to 
reflect directly upon its own operations and discover non-hypothetical a priori ‗truths of reason‘ about 
those contents, for his method of ‗descriptive psychology‘. See, Franz Brentano, Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), esp., Book I, Psychology as a Science, Chapter 2, 
‗§ 2. Psychological Method with Special Reference to its Experiential Basis‘. See, also, Franz 
Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. and ed. by Benito Müller (London: Routledge, 1995). Husserl 
tells us that it was from attending Brentano‘s lectures at Vienna University in 1884–86 and, in 
particular, from witnessing his style of philosophizing, tracing all concepts back to their sources in 
intuition, that led him ‗to choose philosophy as my [Husserl‘s] life‘s work‘. Edmund Husserl, 
‗Reminiscences of Franz Brentano‘, trans. by Linda L. McAlister, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by 
Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55 (pp. 47–49).  
32 ‗The study of the stream of experiences is, for its part, carried on in variety of peculiarly structured 
reflective acts which themselves also belong to the stream of experiences and which, in 
corresponding reflections at a higher level, can be made the Objects of phenomenological analyses. 
This is because their analyses is fundamental to a universal phenomenology and to the 
methodological insight quite indispensable to it (unentberliche methodologische Einsicht).‘  Ideas I, p. 
177:147. This marks Husserl‘s major methodological advancement of Brentano‘s idea of descriptive 
psychology (which, following Hume, finds its basis solely on individual inner perceptions) to a 
descriptive-eidetic science, though Husserl is quite right to note that Brentano (who denied the 
existence of any such fictional entities as ‗essences‘) could not see this as the fruition of his own 
ideas. See, Husserl, ‗Reminiscences of Franz Brentano‘, p. 50, and Ideas I, pp. xx:3–4. 
33 See, Ideas I, ‗§75. Phenomenology As a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Experiences‘, pp. 
167–170: 139–141). 
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experience immanently perceived cannot not exist and cannot not exist in the manner of 
its appearing to my actual consciousness.34 No act of outer perceptual-sense 
experience guarantees necessarily the existence of its object to consciousness. A 
thing, because it is spatial in essence, is given, instead, to outer perceptual-sense 
experience one-sidedly, in adumbration, and from perspective variations.35 Each and 
any actual act of outer perceptual-sense experience of a thing points of necessity to 
further ‗legitimating (ausweisende) experience‘ of the same genus (Gattung).36 In 
principle, therefore, an act of outer perceptual-sense experience of a thing is, in 
essence, incomplete.37 It thus follows that the thing that is actually given to an actual 
act of outer perceptual-sense experience could turn out to be other than what it is in 
the how (the way) of its appearing in its very existence to one‘s own actual 
consciousness. In point of fact, the actual thing itself as given, from a 
phenomenological point of view, could always turn out not to exist at all (any 
longer), if the harmony (Zusammenhang) of one‘s intentional experiences fail. From a 
phenomenological point of view, then, the harmony of one‘s own actual 
experiences is a necessary pre-condition for the very appearing of the mode of 
being as thing (Sein als Ding) in its very existence to one‘s own consciousness.38 ‗Thus 
the meaning of our talk of being (der gemeine Sinn der Seinsrede)‘, Husserl concludes, ‗is 
exactly the opposite of what it ordinarily is (kehrt sich [...] um).‘39 Things do not exist 
 
34 See, Ideas I, ‗§39. Consciousness and Natural Actuality. The ―Naive‖ Human Being‘s Conception‘; 
and ‗§46. Indubitability of the Perception of Something Immanent, Dubitability of the Perception of 
Something Transcendent‘. 
35 See, Ideas I, ‗§42. Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality. Essentially Necessary Difference 
Between Modes of Intuition‘; and,‘ §44 Merely Phenomenal Being of Something Transcendent and 
Absolute Being of Something Immanent‘. 
36 See Ideas I, ‗§47. The Natural World as a Correlate of Consciousness‘. See, also, de Boer, pp. 335–
39. 
37 See, Ideas I, ‗§43. The Clarification of a Fundamental Error‘; and, ‗§44 Merely Phenomenal Being 
of Something Transcendent and Absolute Being of Something Immanent‘. 
38 In a letter to Dilthey‘s nephew, Georg Misch, in 1929, Husserl both draws attention to and re-
iterates his defense of ‗the essential correlation between consciousness and being‘ in §47 of Ideas I, 
and remarks that, ‗(L)ikewise, the ‗relativity of nature‘ does not refer to an infinite succession of 
relations between natural objects within the general unity of nature. Rather, it refers (again, 
constitutively) to the fact that nature-as-such qua experienced, both the nature of sense perception 
and the nature of natural science (which both we and the scientist take as always simply in being and 
valid as being), is relative to the current constitutive subjectivity (intersubjectivity, a community of 
researchers in the specific historical time). I myself understood that at this point I had already 
abandoned any absolute being of nature (and any absolutely valid natural laws). I further understood 
[…] [in my 1910–11 Logos article, ‗Philosophy as Rigorous Science‘] phenomenology as a radical and 
universal ‗humanistic science,‘ in a far more radical way that Dilthey did, due to the [transcendental] 
phenomenological reduction (which I first explicitly addressed in my lectures of 1907) — whereas 
Dilthey stuck to the historical humanistic sciences, and consequently to the already given world, and 
to anthropology. That is what Heidegger [in Husserl‘s estimation] also does in his brilliant book 
[Being and Time], which abandons my method of constitutive phenomenology.‘ Husserl, ‗August 3, 
1929: Edmund Husserl to Georg Misch‘, in Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger, p. 397.  
39 Ideas I, p. 112:94, trans. mod.: ‗So kehrt sich der gemeine Sinn der Seinsrede um.‘ Husserl 
continues, stressing the difference between the meaning of Being as thing (Sein als Ding) and the 
meaning of Being as (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis): ‗The being which is first for us is 
second in itself; i.e. it is what it is, only in ‗relation‘ to the first. […] Reality, the reality of the physical 
thing taken singly and the reality of the whole world, lacks self-sufficiency in virtue of its essence (in 
our strict sense of the word). Reality is not something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to 
something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no ‗absolute essence‘ whatever; 
it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an object of 
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first in order for them be perceived, or known, or grasped in whatever way they are, 
as we assume in the natural attitude, rather consciousness exists first as the 
transcendental ground of their very being. And this is what Husserl‘s famous 
reduction ‗lays bare‘.40 Consciousness cannot be founded in a thing, or be 
considered part of a thing because the existence of the latter is dependent upon the 
existence of consciousness itself. 
Part of the main task that Husserl set for himself in Part Two: The 
Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology of Ideas I, that houses Husserl‘s 
(in)famous ‗reduction‘, therefore, is to provide an argument that would demonstrate 
apodictically that the mode of being of (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis) 
cannot, in principle, be reduced in its examination to the mode of being of a thing 
(Sein als Ding) that is given to outer perceptual-sense experience.41 If such naturalism 
in the form of the reification of consciousness was not refuted, this would sound, in 
Husserl‘s (correct) estimation, the death-knell of all considerations and reflections 
on the significance of specific human consciousness, and that, for Husserl (but 
unlike Heidegger of Being and Time) includes not only logical and aesthetical 
consciousness but religious-ethical consciousness as well. Yet the specific task of 
Ideas I is to overcome the prevailing absolutization of nature and the naturalization 
of consciousness and its objectivities.  This is why the question of the existence and 
the transcendence of God must be excluded from the conception of ‗first 
philosophy‘ that Husserl defends in that study. Since establishing ‗the absolute 
sphere [of pure intentional consciousness] peculiar to phenomenology‘ is the main 
goal of the ‗fundamental meditation‘, Husserl remarks that ‗our immediate aim is 
not theology, but phenomenology, however important the latter may be for the 
former‘.42  
Whilst Husserl, then, clearly recognizes that phenomenology could be of 
importance to theology, Husserl does not entertain whether some conception of 
theology or of religious thinking could be of importance to phenomenology, or not. 
Theology or religious thinking, as Husserl recognises, is simply not part of Husserl’s 
definition of what constitutes phenomenology as ‗first philosophy‘.43 Ultimately, 
 
consciousness, something presented in the manner peculiar to consciousness, something apparent 
[or of possible presentations, only actualizable in possible appearances]‘ (ibid., pp.112–113:94). 
40 Ideas I, p. xix:3. 
41 The other part of his main task is to provide ‗a new scientific domain‘ (§32) for his new science of 
phenomenology to investigate, and this he finds in the intentionality of consciousness, after 
consciousness has been purified of all naturalistic conceptions. See, Ideas I, Part Two: The 
Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology, esp., §§27–55.  
42 Ideas I, §51. The Significance of the Transcendental Preliminary Considerations, ―Note‖, 116–
117:96–97. 
43 See, also, where Husserl later re-iterates the priority for philosophy (i.e. for his conception of 
philosophy as transcendental phenomenology, faced with the rising tide and challenge of 
philosophical and scientific naturalism that effaces the significances of the experiences of human 
ethical and religious consciousness) to address ‗a necessary theoretical question‘ of explaining the 
existence of the world in its correlation to the actual consciousness of an existing human being by 
comparison to the way in which ‗the naiveté‘ and ‗(T)he enigma of the creation [of the world and of 
human beings in that world] and that of God himself are essential component parts of positive 
religion‘. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Northwestern: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970), ‗§53. The Paradox of Human Subjectivity: Being a Subject for 
the World and at the Same Time Being an Object in the World‘, pp. 180–81. 
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therefore, there is no ‗porosity‘ (to use William Desmond‘s term)44 admitted 
between religious consciousness and theoretical-philosophical consciousness by 
Husserl, though the legitimacy of religious experience and religious thought is 
certainly not denied by Husserl. The latter, rather, he assumes in his very definition 
and meditation of transcendental phenomenology as first philosophy, but it is 
placed outside of that definition of philosophy as ‗first philosophy‘, just as Kant had 
done earlier in his definition of transcendental philosophy. As Husserl acutely notes, 
following Kant, ‗(T)he idea of God is a necessary limiting concept in 
epistemological considerations, and an indispensable index to the construction of 
certain limiting concepts which not even the [post-Kantian] philosophizing atheist 
[or theist] can do without‘.45  
Once it is granted, however, that the non-existence of the entire world of 
things given to actual outer perceptual-sense experiences is entirely thinkable, from 
an apodictic-phenomenological point of view,46 it follows that no legitimate 
transcendental deduction of an infinity of reflective acts on the outer perceptual-
sense experience (i.e., on sense judgment) of such ‗things‘ in their appearing to 
one‘s actual consciousness is justifiable, no matter how ‗natural‘ this may appear to 
anyone living in the ‗natural attitude‘.47 By comparison, an act of reflective, 
immanent perception directly grasps its object. The possibility that the experience 
currently reflected upon does not exist is an eidetic-ontological impossibility. An act 
of reflective immanent perception guarantees necessarily the existence of its object 
to my actual consciousness.48 In truth, we know apodictically that an experience given 
 
44 William Desmond, God and the Between (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008) p. 35, 331, 340. For a recent 
attempt to see religious experience as something that is sui generis, and thus as something that is 
amenable to philosophical-phenomenological analysis along Husserlian lines, however, see Anthony 
Steinbock‘s study, Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2007). 
45 Ideas I, 187:147, n. 17. See, supra, n. 4, and our comment on the significance of this. 
46 This is what Husserl means by his repeatable, ‗world-annihilation thought experiment‘, because the 
world, as Husserl understands it, is simply the totality of things that is given and can be given to 
one‘s one own actual consciousness via acts of outer perceptual sense-experience.  
47 This applies to the natural scientist as well, of course. That reflection on things given to outer 
perceptual-sense experience is, from a regulative point of view, infinite cannot be doubted; but we 
cannot, therefore, legitimately infer from this that such natural science is either moving closer to or 
further way from the truth of things in themselves. For the natural scientist, then, this regulative 
ideal is purely procedural and still based, from Husserl‘s point of view, on the naive (pre-critical and 
fictional) hypothesis that in perception things are there, whether attention is directed towards them, 
or not. 
48 This is the major difference between the position adopted in Logical Investigations and in Ideas I. In 
the Logical Investigations the experiences of a valid, logical consciousness as such is the only concern in 
the descriptive-psychological clarification of the eidos of valid logical acts of reasoning. To include 
features of one‘s natural, empirical consciousness would lead to naturalism in the form of logical 
psychologism, which Husserl had already refuted in the First Volume of the Logical Investigations. As 
Husserl remarks in the Introduction to Part One of the Second Volume of the German Editions of 
his Logical Investigations, descriptive-eidetic clarifications can abstract from the existence of any reader 
‗whose existence (like one‘s own) is not therefore presupposed by the content of one‘s 
investigations‘ (§7). In Ideas I, however, Husserl begins with actual consciousness of the world about 
us, taking the thing (Sein als Ding) given to outer perceptual-sense experience as one of pivotal points 
of departure for his analyses and, for the other, the experience of reflection, that is, the ability of 
one‘s own actual consciousness to reflect upon itself in immanent perception (Sein als Erlebnis). See, 
Ideas I, ‗§38. Reflections on Acts. Perception of Something Immanent and of Something 
Transcendent‘.  
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in reflective immanent perception exists. It is thus consciousness, and not things, 
which in the natural attitude we (pre-)suppose in perception to be simply there and 
present (vorhanden), whether attention is directed towards them or not, that is the 
first and foremost reality for philosophy and phenomenology to investigate. 
Overcoming this very (hypo)thesis of the natural attitude, therefore, is of crucial 
importance to the development of Husserl‘s thought and to his elaboration of 
phenomenology as a rigorous, radical new science of intentional consciousness and 
its objectivities. 
There is, nevertheless, one major discernible difference to which Husserl 
draws our attention between an experience that is reflected upon in immanent 
perception and an experience that is either lived and not reflected upon or an 
experience that is reflected upon as part of the endless stream of experiences for 
knowledge, and that is, in immanent perception ‗a consciousness of the living now 
of the experience (in der das lebendige Jetzt des Erlebnisses)‘ is present as such (and hidden 
from any other forms of inner or outer reflection). In other words, apodictic insight 
into the existence of an experience that is reached in reflective immanent perception 
points of phenomenological necessity to some perception of time, or more precisely, of 
temporality in the very being of one‘s own, actual, finite consciously lived experiences, 
whether reflected upon or not, and however infinite, in principle, reflection on one‘s 
own finite experiences is, as Husserl, following Kant, correctly transcendentally 
deduces. And here, I suggest, is where Heidegger steps in to out-step Husserl, most 
controversially, in the advancement of an alternative definition and alternative conception 
of phenomenology, one that is committed precisely to the task of thinking the 
temporality of the finiteness of such experiences themselves, something that even 
Kant himself, according to Heidegger, shied away from, but one about which 
Heidegger is equally adamant that must be addressed both in the wake and from 
within the constraints, but in the spirit of the Kantian critique.49 Heidegger, in other 
 
49 ‗The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the 
dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena 
themselves is Kant. […]  Kant himself was aware that he was venturing into an area of obscurity. 
[…]  Here Kant [in his Critique of Pure Reason] shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something that 
must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression ‗Being‘ is to have any 
demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading 
of ‗Temporality‘ in our analysis, are precisely those most covert judgements of the ‗common reason‘ for 
which Kant says it is the ‗business of philosophers‘ to provide an analytic. […]  At the same time we 
shall show why Kant could never achieve an insight into the problematic of Temporality. There were 
two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, 
in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in 
Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.‘ Being 
and Time, 45:23–24. For Kant, however, space and time only come into play, epistemologically, when 
we are presented with the sensible manifold — but not any conceptualization of space and time can 
do the job for Kant; rather, it is really the conceptualization of space and time in ‗above all 
mathematical physics (what Kant calls ‗pure natural science‘) that exemplifies the application of the 
categories [of our understanding] to objects of experience‘. Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: 
Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2000), p. 32. Furthermore, 
because space and time are necessary pre-conditions of our actual experience they cannot be objects 
of actual experiences, i.e., Kant does not regard them as ‗phenomena‘. This is the reason, perhaps, 
why Kant, in Heidegger‘s estimation, did not and could not address the phenomenological problem of 
temporality of those acts themselves, or of human existence either. Friedman notes, however, that 
Heidegger ‗later explicitly ―retracted‖ his reading [of Kant] as an ―over-interpretation‖ in the preface 
to the third (1963) and fourth (1973) editions [of Heidegger‘s Kantbuch, 1929]‘. A Parting of the Ways, 
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words, wants to be more Kantian than Kant himself, and more Husserlian than 
Husserl himself,  and, indeed, more Kantian than each and any of his fellow 
Kantians of the day, as his famous dispute with Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929 
demonstrates.50 
 
 
II 
HEIDEGGER ON THE TASK OF THINKING  
FINITUDE AFTER KANT 
 
Reminiscing about his ‗first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy‘, 
Heidegger recounts the story in his autobiographical sketch ‗My Way into 
Phenomenology‘ (1963) of when he tried to read Brentano‘s doctoral study Von der 
mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (1862), which he had received from 
Konrad Gröber, the pastor of Trinity Church in Constance, in the Summer of 
1907.51 Heidegger was only seventeen at the time when he first attempted to read 
this text. It is not surprising, therefore, that, at first, he found Brentano‘s 
dissertation difficult to understand, but the more he read and re-read this text in the 
years to follow the more the following quandary, he recalls, emerged for him. If 
Aristotle operates with four quite distinct meanings (Bedeutungen) in his reflections 
on ‗that which is‘ (das Seiende) — in terms of Being as property (Sein als Eigenschaft); 
Being as possibility and actuality (Sein als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit); Being as truth 
(Sein als Wahrheit); and Being as schema of the categories (Sein als Schema der 
Kategorien) — what, then, is the general understanding of the meaning of Being itself 
(Sinn von Sein) from which Aristotle operates and to which he subscribes?  From 
where do all of these several senses of that-which-is in Being derive their 
designations?52  Heidegger tells us that he could not find any answer to this question 
in Brentano‘s dissertation, but went in search, almost immediately, of Husserl‘s 
 
p. 61, n. 75. It is only in Husserl’s account of ‗immanent perception‘ that there is a direct, albeit 
implicit, perceptual understanding of the temporality of human lived experiences, and it is this basis to 
Husserl‘s version of Kantian transcendental idealism that Heidegger wishes to think more radically 
than Husserl did or than Kant could. 
50 See Friedman‘s excellent book, already referred to above, on this debate, A Parting of the Ways: 
Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. 
51 See, Martin Heidegger, ‗My Way into Phenomenology‘, in Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. by 
Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 74; original publication, ‗Mein Weg in die 
Phänomenologie‘ in Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), 81. 
Stambaugh translates the title of Heidegger‘s essay ‗Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie‘ as ‗My Way to 
Phenomenology‘. In this essay, however, Heidegger clearly wishes to convey to his readers that his 
way into phenomenology (in die Phänomenologie), in spite of all the contingencies that lead him to 
Husserl‘s texts and to meeting Husserl personally in his workshops at Freiburg University (1919–
1923), was a way that eventually lead him through (durch) phenomenology to ‗the Being-Question‘, 
however controversial that matter for thought (zur Sache des Denkens) may appear to Husserl (and his 
followers). We will refer to this essay, therefore, as, ‗My Way into Phenomenology‘. All of these 
essays written by Heidegger and contained in  Zur Sache des Denkens: ‗Zeit und Sein‘ (1962), ‗Mein 
Weg in die Phänomenologie‘ (1963), and ‗Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens‘ 
(1964), address this same issue of what Husserl left ‗unthought‘ (ungedacht), in one way or another. 
52 Brentano devotes a separate chapter to each of these four meanings of being in his doctoral 
dissertation, though it is of importance to point out that Brentano‘s dissertation itself does not address 
the particular question that Heidegger himself seeks to address. The one that Heidegger wishes to address 
is directed towards the determination of the understanding of the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein). 
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Logical Investigations from the University‘s library, in the very first semester when he 
entered the Theological Seminary at Freiburg in 1909, because ‗I had learned from 
many references in philosophical periodicals that Husserl‘s way of thinking (Husserls 
Denkweise) was determined by Franz Brentano.‘53 ‗Thus,‘ Heidegger informs us, 
‗both volumes of Husserl‘s Logical Investigations lay on my desk in the theological 
seminary ever since my first semester there.‘54 What Heidegger does not mention 
(or recall), nevertheless, is that he would have learned from the articles in the 
journals he read in 1909 and from his reading of the Logical Investigations themselves 
in the years to follow that Husserl‘s thought was not determined at all by Brentano, 
the Aristotelian-Thomistic commentator, but by the later Brentano of the Vienna 
period (1874–1894), that is to say, by Brentano the modern inspired (Cartesian-
Lockean-Humean) descriptive psychologist. In light of this, it is not that surprising 
that Heidegger tells us that his efforts aimed at achieving ‗a decisive aid in the 
questions stimulated by Brentano‘s dissertation‘, which he ‗expected [to receive] 
from Husserl‘s Logical Investigations‘, turned out to be, at least initially, ‗in vain‘.55 In 
this autobiographical sketch, however, Heidegger notes that his interest in Husserl‘s 
Logical Investigations stayed with him for many years to follow, throughout the time 
he spent when he undertook doctoral research into problems and issues around 
meaning and logic in medieval philosophy, and when he became Husserl‘s assistant 
lecturer in philosophy at Freiburg (1918–1923). A glance, indeed, at some of the 
titles of the lecture-courses and seminars that Heidegger gave, first at Freiburg and 
then at Marburg (1923–28),  indicates his continued interest not only in Husserl‘s 
Logical Investigations but also in Husserl‘s Ideas I.56 Throughout this entire time — 
 
53 ‗My Way into Phenomenology‘, p. 74:71, trans. mod.: ‗Aus manchen Hinweisen in 
philosophischen Zeitschriften hatte ich erfahren, daß Husserls Denkweise durch Franz Brentano 
bestimmt sei.‘ 
54 Ibid. 
55 ‗My Way into Phenomenology‘, p. 75:82. Heidegger says it was Husserl‘s Sixth Logical 
Investigation, and in particular the distinction worked out in the Investigation between ‗categorial 
and sensuous intuition‘ that played a decisive role in engendering a positive influence on his ‗path of 
thinking‘ (Der Denkweg) about ‗the Being-question‘ (die Seinsfrage). The Sixth Logical Investigation is, 
in fact, a phenomenological enquiry into and a meditation on Kant‘s thesis ‗Being is not a real 
predicate‘. See, Husserl, Logical Investigations, Logical Investigation No. VI, esp., § 43, pp. 780–781. If 
Heidegger is correct about this, this means, therefore, that it is an advancement of post-Kantian 
reflection on the meaning of Being that is more decisive in Heidegger‘s ‗path of thinking‘ about ‗the 
Being-question‘ than any pre-Kantian reflection in metaphysics. Husserl‘s Ideas I also has a very significant 
influence on Heidegger‘s thinking, but he seems to be either not aware of it or to play it down. From 
both a historical and a philosophical perspective, nonetheless, Heidegger offers an alternative to 
Husserl‘s (idealist) version of transcendental phenomenology, a position Husserl had not reached in 
the Logical Investigations. 
56 See, Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger, ‗B. Heidegger‘s University Education and Teaching, 1909–1930,‘ 
pp. xxxv–lvii. This section is a revised and updated version of ‗Heidegger‘s Lehrveranstaltungen, 
1915–30 (German-English)‘, first published as Appendix B‘ in Kisiel‘s Genesis, pp. 461–476, and is 
supplemented with the curriculum (Lehrplan) that Heidegger, as a student, followed at the University 
of Freiburg from 1909 through to 1915. Kisiel remarks that Heidegger‘s reception from Husserl of 
the latter‘s unpublished manuscript of Ideen II (dealing with ‗naturalistic‘ and ‗personalistic 
consciousness‘, ‗nature and spirit‘) in February 1925 ‗seems to have driven Heidegger to a renewed 
detailed examination of Husserl‘s work, especially the Sixth Logical Investigation, the [1910-11] 
Logos-essay[‗Philosophy as a Rigorous Science‘] and Ideas I‘ in preparation for Heidegger‘s 1925 
lecture course Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitsbegriffs. Kisiel, Heidegger’s Way of Thought. Critical and 
Interpretative Signposts, ed. by Alfred Dunker & Marion Heinz (London & New York: Continuum, 
2002), p. 38.  
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from his earliest students days of theology and philosophy to his early lecturing days 
in philosophy at Freiburg University and Marburg University — Heidegger informs 
us elsewhere, however, that he also was interested in works written by Dilthey, 
Kierkegaard, Augustine, Nietzsche, Jaspers and engaged in phenomenological 
readings of Aristotle‘s texts and of other texts by many more authors.57 Besides 
Husserl‘s texts in phenomenology, texts by these other authors too figure in his 
lecture-course and seminars throughout this period. It was, nevertheless, under the 
weight of influence from his voracious readings of works by Dilthey, Kierkegaard, 
Augustine, Nietzsche and Jaspers, that Heidegger re-interprets the experiencing of the 
‗living now‘ that Husserl had identified in the enactment of ‗[reflective] immanent 
perception‘ in Ideas I as something that is itself founded in (,or, at least indicative of) 
an immediate, pre-reflective implicit knowledge of radical temporality in the understanding 
of one‘s own very being-in-the-world.58 That is to say, throughout the 1920s, the 
concept of the experiencing of the ‗living now‘ that Husserl had identified in 
reflective, immanent perception in Ideas I is considered by Heidegger as something 
that is experienced, first and foremost, in one‘s own entire, individually lived, 
existentially rooted, historical being-in-the-world, and not just, as it is and was for 
Husserl in Ideas I in terms of a retrievable, explicit, incorrigible knowledge-claim 
concerning the existence of an isolatable, individually wrapped, atomistically 
captured and mentally abstracted ‗consciously lived experience (Erlebnis),‘ however 
apodictically  certain and synchronically (but non-diachronically) connected in time 
such immanent perception must be. Thus the main point that Heidegger wishes to 
argue for in Being and Time is that ‗something like [the meaning of] Being‘, in all its 
radical temporality, and however unconceptualised, lies present and vaguely 
understood by each and every one of us in any ‗talk of Being‘ (Seinsrede) about 
anything that one actually experiences, such as, for instance, in statements like, ‗the 
sky is blue‘, ‗I am happy‘, and so forth.59 Retrieving the sedimented meaning of this 
 
57 In 1957, Heidegger recalls: ‗What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot 
be adequately expressed; I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second, significantly 
enlarged edition of Nietzsche‘s The Will to Power, the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in 
translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke‘s works and Trakl‘s poems, Dilthey‘s 
Collected Writings.‘ Heidegger, ‗A Recollection (1957)‘, in Heidegger: The Man and Thinker, ed. by 
Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc, 1981), pp. 21–22 (p. 22). 
58 Spiegelberg remarks that the study of Kierkegaard ‗became widespread in Germany after the First 
World War and […] was promoted further by Jaspers‘ account of him‘. The Phenomenological Movement, 
363. See, David Farrell Krell‘s excellent account of Heidegger‘s review of Jaspers‘s 1919 book, 
‗Toward Sein und Zeit: Heidegger‘s Early Review of Jaspers‘ ‗Psychologie der Weltanschauungen‘,‘ Journal of 
the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 6 (1975), 147–156; reprinted as, ‗From Existence to 
Fundamental Ontology‘, in Krell, Intimations of Mortality (University Park, Pa., London: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1986), pp. 11–26. Kisiel notes that it is in his 1923 lecture-course at Marburg 
University where Heidegger ‗first publicly acknowledges his debt to Kierkegaard‘ (Genesis, 275). 
Heidegger‘s evaluation of Kierkegaard‘s philosophical relation to subjectivity characteristic of post-
Kantian German idealism in Being and Time (Division Two, Dasein and Temporality, §45, n. 6) is, 
however, eminently debatable. Heidegger‘s own closeness to German idealism has received critical 
attention. See, Heidegger, German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism, ed. by Tom Rockmore (New York: 
Humanities Books, 2000), in particular Alfred Denker‘s account in ‗The Young Heidegger and 
Fichte‘, pp. 103–122, esp., p. 119. 
59 According to Heidegger, ‗[The meaning of] Being can be something unconceptualised (unbegriffen), 
but it is never completely incomprehensible (es ist nie völlig unverstanden)‘ (Being and Time, p. 228:183). 
This is what lies behind Heidegger‘s earlier remarks in the Introduction to Being and Time, when he 
makes the point: ‗In all cognitions and statements, in every comportment to that which is (zu 
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experience of temporal resonance residing in this activity and in this expression of 
the meaning of Being, ‗those most covert judgements of the ―common reason‖,‘ as 
Heidegger emphasizes in Being and Time, quoting Kant, is ‗the business of 
philosophers‘.60 
  Strictly speaking, however, this is not Kant speaking. This sounds, rather, 
more like the neo-Kantian Dilthey speaking. In Dilthey‘s well-known triad, human 
experience (Erlebnis) contains implicitly some form of understanding (Verstehen) 
which, in turn, is completed and raised to a higher level of meaning in expression 
(Ausdruck). This is borne out in the experience of language itself and is derived from 
the experience of language and, as such, is confirmed in the reading and in the 
interpreting of words, whether written or spoken. For, what else do we do, when 
reading a poem, or hearing a play, or trying to understand a philosophical idea, but 
to tap into the deposited meaning expressed and left ‗unthought‘ (ungedacht) in the 
text of the author (and left ‗unthought‘ by the author of the text).61 A raid upon the 
experience of language is always an interpretive raid upon something articulated, 
something thought and something understood, however partially expressed and 
incompletely understood such meaning is and must be. This methodological priority 
and necessity for ‗hermeneutics‘ in the task of retrieving and understanding the 
meaning of any experience Dilthey of course learned from Schleiermacher. In fact, 
Dilthey‘s defence of the hermeneutic-triadic unity of ‗experience-understanding-
expression‘ is so internalised by Heidegger that Heidegger can see and discern 
meanings in words that neither Dilthey himself, nor any other German, nor any 
other etymologist, either before or after Heidegger could because the very term ‗Da-
sein‘ itself (whether hyphenated by Heidegger, or not) as Heidegger now 
understands this word, will be the linguistic expression of the awareness of ‗the 
There‘ (Da) of ‗Being‘ (Sein), and in which I find myself implicated ‗as that-which-is‘ 
(als Seiendes) in being and as a being that has some implicit ‗understanding of Being‘ 
(Seinsverständis) as an integral note of that very being‘s mode of being-in-the-world, 
and all of this as a matter of fact, that is to say, as a fact of lived experience: Da-sein. 
And so, but in direct contra-distinction to Dilthey‘s methodological historical-
hermeneutic stress that our self-understanding today is bound up with historical 
knowledge of others in the past and that such historical knowledge of human self-
understanding is never completed in principle but always partially unfolding in the 
 
Seiendem), in every behaving towards oneself itself, use is made of ‗[the meaning of] Being‘, and the 
expression (der Ausdruck) is thereby (dabei) comprehensible (verständlich) ―without further ado‖. 
Everyone understands: ―The sky is blue‖; ―I am happy‖, and similar statements‘. Being and Time, p. 
23:4, trans. modified: ‗In allem Erkennen, Aussagen, in jedem Verhalten zu Seiendem, in jedem Sich-
zu-sich-selbst-verhalten wird von ―[Sinn von] Sein‖ Gebrauch gemacht, und der Ausdruck ist dabei 
―ohne weiteres‖ verständlich. Jeder versteht: ―Der Himmel ist blau‖; ―ich bin froh‖ und dgl.‘ 
60  Being and Time, p. 45:23–24; but, see, supra, n. 49, and our comments on this ‗over reading‘ of Kant 
by Heidegger. 
61 Thus Schleiermacher‘s challenging principle of hermeneutics: that one must try to understand the 
author better than himself. Heidegger seems to be adhering methodologically to this principle, in some 
significant sense, throughout his encounter with the texts of philosophers that he read and in the very 
way in which he does phenomenology. Not all authors understand their work better than their critics, but 
most do. Yet Schleiermacher‘s injunction is to understand the work of the author better than the 
author himself, and that requires not reading into an author‘s text what is not there and reading what 
is not there but determinative for the author‘s thoughts accurately. It seems to me that Heidegger is 
often guilty of reading into an author‘s text ideas that are not there, but it is outside of the limits of 
this article to elaborate.  
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context of the whole of one‘s own historically lived experience, Heidegger can 
insist, with the help of Kierkegaard, on singling out the methodological significance of 
‗brooding over one‘s own death‘ (in the mood of Angst) in attesting to the 
understanding that I have of the implicit temporality of the whole of one‘s own, 
actual, individual human existence (in Dasein) as such.  
Heidegger‘s Kierkegaardian-existentialistic rendering of Dilthey‘s thesis of 
Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck is probably best captured in the following famous 
definition of the temporality of one‘s own existence (in Dasein) that Heidegger gives 
in Being and Time, when he writes: 
 
In such Being-towards-its-end, Dasein exists in a way which is authentically whole 
as that entity which it can be when ‗thrown into death‘. This entity does not have 
an end at which it just stops, but it exists finitely (existiert endlich). The authentic future 
is temporalized primarily by that temporality which makes up the meaning of 
anticipatory resoluteness: it thus reveals itself as finite (als endliche) […]  In our thesis 
that temporality is primordially finite, we are not disputing that ‗time goes on‘; we 
are simply holding fast to the phenomenal character of primordial temporality — a 
character which shows itself in what is projected in Dasein‘s primordial existential 
projecting.62 
 
That ‗time goes on‘, both irrespective and outside of my concern for my own 
finitude in existence, and that history goes on likewise, irrespective and outside of 
my concern for my own finitude in existence, does not seem to figure critically in 
Heidegger‘s thinking at all.63 At any rate, the ‗understanding of Being‘, which 
Heidegger acknowledges that extends equally to and includes the world, oneself and 
one‘s fellow human being, over time and in time, throughout history and in history, 
as Dilthey argued, ultimately, however, as Heidegger now argues, recoils back into 
the concern that one has for one‘s own being in terms of what ‗goes about‘ (es geht 
um) for that individual being in the very understanding of Being that is ‗expressed‘ 
by that being‘s being in Dasein.64 If you were a Darwinian or a Nietzschean, you 
would have to say that, for Heidegger, self-preservation or the exercise of one‘s 
own individual will-to-power is what fundamentally drives an individual human 
being‘s way of existing as ‗a self‘ in Dasein.65 
 
62 Being and Time, pp. 378–9:329–330.  
63 This responsibility before (devant), for (pour) and to (à) the other (l’autre) does feature, however, in 
Levinas‘s profound critique of Heidegger‘s existentialisitic rendering of both Kierkegaard and 
Dilthey‘s concerns. See, E. Levinas, Unforeseen History, tr. by Nidra Poller (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2004): Les Imprévus de l’histoire (Éditions Fata Morgana, 1994). For 
Levinas‘s remarks on Kierkegaard‘s relation to Heidegger, see his short essay contained in this 
collection, ‗Letter Concerning Jean Wahl‘, pp. 67–70. 
64  ‗Dasein is a being which does not just occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically 
distinguished by the fact it is a being in whose being this being itself is what goes about.‘ Being and 
Time, 32:12, trans. modified: ‗Das Dasein is ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden 
vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein 
um dieses Sein selbst geht.‘ ‗The Being (of Dasein) is that which is at stake for every such being.‘ Being 
and Time, p. 67:42, trans. mod.: ‗Das Sein ist es, darum es diesem Seienden je selbst geht.‘  
65 See, E. Levinas, ‗Heidegger‘, in Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. by Richard 
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), pp. 35–44. See, also, E. Levinas, ‗Dialogue 
with Emmanuel Levinas‘, in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 49–69 (p. 60). 
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 Whatever about the nature and extent of the influences that the 
considerations of Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Augustine, Jaspers, and Nietzsche had  on 
Heidegger‘s establishment of his new concept of ‗Dasein‘, Heidegger does believe 
that in his specific analysis of ‗authentic selfhood‘ — which he explicitly argues in 
Being and Time is disclosed and only disclosed in the anticipatory awareness in the 
present of one‘s self running headlong for one‘s own death in the future (Vorlaufen 
zum Tode) in the mood of Angst — he is thinking finitude from within the limits of 
the experience of finitude itself, therein, in his estimation, guaranteeing his 
membership of the club of post-Kantian phenomenological philosophers (and of 
the atheistic, existential-phenomenological variety of that club at that).66 Does not a 
limit recognised as a limit, however, point, in that very recognition, to what is 
outside of that limit, and to that which is outside of that limit and necessarily so?  
Heidegger does remark in Being and Time that his analysis of human 
existence in Dasein pertains to this side of the grave only, and that it centres on one’s 
own understanding of Being and on the concern of that being’s understanding of 
being-in-the-world as announced in the anticipatory awareness of that being‘s own 
death in Dasein.67 This leaves untouched but acknowledged and thought, however 
implicitly so, at least three things, namely: (1) the significance of the existence of the 
understanding of others in their life experiences; 68 (2) the significance of the existence 
of that which lies beyond the grave; and (3) the significance of the existence of that 
which lies beyond the comprehension of the innermost finitude of one‘s own 
being-in-the-world. All of these are equally thought in my experience of the very 
existence (in Heidegger‘s sense) of my own finitude in the world and in my 
experience of the very existence (not in Heidegger‘s sense) of others, myself and the 
world.  
We cannot of course expect Heidegger to engage in a hermeneutic retrieval 
of the significances of the meaning of these experiences that he has left ‗unthought‘ 
in his own analysis and thinking of finitude from within the experience of finitude 
itself in Being and Time, but we can; and I suggest that we can with the help of and in 
the direction of Schleiermacher‘s particular reflections on ‗religious self-
consciousness‘, for, as Schleiermacher remarks in his On Religion: Addresses in 
Response to its Cultured Critics, ‗(O)f course, it is an illusion to seek the infinite 
precisely outside of the finite, to seek the opposite outside that to which it is 
opposed.‘69 Schleiermacher‘s directive, rather, is to think the existence of the infinite 
inside of that to which is it opposed; that is to say, the task is to begin with our 
experience of the existence of the finite in relation to our experience of the existence of 
the infinite in our experiential recognition of the finite. This invitation for thought 
begins with experience and in experience, and neither denies nor affirms the 
existence of a determinate infinite being outside of human experience of finitude. In 
fact, misunderstanding the relation of the finite to the infinite in the latter manner, 
 
66 See, Leo Strauss, ‗An Introduction to Heideggerean Existentialism‘, in his The Rebirth of Classical 
Political Rationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 27–46. 
67 See, Being and Time, ‗§49. How the Existential Analysis of Death is Distinguished from Other 
Possible Interpretations of this Phenomenon‘, pp. 290–293 (p. 292):246–249 (248). 
68 Thus the existence of the understanding of others can call into question the existence of my 
understanding of the ‗there of Being‘, and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is among 
fellow human beings in the world, as Levinas was later to argue. This has profound ethical 
implications too.  
69 Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 59. 
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as Schleiermacher also notes in On Religion, calls not for a rejection but for a 
clarification of the proper understanding of the relation of the finite to the infinite.70 
Whilst Kant, therefore, correctly drew attention to the illicit move in any ontological 
form of argumentation that runs from the idea of an infinite being to the existence 
of such an infinite being, this leaves both unaddressed and unthought the significance of 
the experience of the existence of the finite itself in relation to the existence of the 
infinite itself, as expressed and documented in religious experience. Kant himself, 
after all, does not and cannot deny the significance of such religious belief to his 
own critical standpoint in philosophy for the entire enterprise of his Critique of Pure 
Reason is engendered by it, for, as he informs his reader in the 1789 Preface to the 
Second Edition of this Critique, ‗I had, therefore, to remove knowledge [of the 
existence of God], in order to make room for belief [in God]‘ (B. xxx).  
Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, then, have at least this much all in common, 
they side-step the implicit significance of philosophical reflection on the relation of 
the experience of the self, as existing, in relation to the experience of the infinite, as 
existing, in their determination and demarcation of ‗first philosophy‘. It is, 
therefore, to Schleiermacher‘s explicit task of thinking the finite and infinite 
together, after Kant, as a possible critique of Husserl and Heidegger‘s respective 
philosophies of experiences, and of Kant‘s position too, that I now turn. 
 
 
III 
SCHLEIERMACHER ON THE TASK OF THINKING THE FINITE AND 
THE INFINITE TOGETHER, AFTER KANT 
 
Husserl is quite right to note that reflection on any of our lived experiences as 
objects of finite knowledge-claims presupposes the ideal-regulative-possibility of 
reflecting infinitely on the content of such experiences, and that this is not an 
experience of the infinite as documented in religious experience, but a feature of 
our human understanding, just as Kant had argued. And Heidegger is quite right to 
insist, following Husserl, that reflection on the finiteness of our experiences is 
phenomenologically grounded in a perception of the temporality of finite 
experiences themselves. If, however, Heidegger stresses reflection on the latter as a 
methodological requirement in phenomenology, he can only do so by rejecting outright 
Husserl‘s definition of phenomenology as an eidetic science of intentional 
consciousness and its objectivities that specifically excludes such philosophical 
speculation, and by appropriating instead a hermeneutic possibility that Dilthey, 
following Schleiermacher, saw in reflecting on the significances of individual 
experiences themselves that find their meaning in the experiences themselves for 
each and any human being‘s actual understanding of themselves in relation to the 
totality of that individual‘s life experiences as expressed in poetry, language and 
thought. Drawing as much on Plato and Augustine‘s efforts to understand their 
own particular life experiences, as on his own life experiences, Schleiermacher 
remarks in The Christian Faith, 
 
70 Schleiermacher would have been thoroughly aware of St John, the evangelist, stylistic use of the 
misunderstanding in his writings in communicating the teachings of Jesus as initial misunderstanding 
invites clarification as to interpreting its proper meaning and its proper understanding, not rejection 
(e.g., the story of the woman at the well misunderstanding Jesus‘ request to wash her feet). 
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In the first place, it is everybody‘s experience that there are moments in which all 
thinking and willing retreat behind a self-consciousness of one form or another; 
but, in the second place, that at times this same form of self-consciousness persists 
unaltered during a series of diverse acts of thinking and willing, taking up no relation to 
these, and thus not being in the proper sense even an accompaniment of them. 
Thus joy and sorrow — those mental phases which are always so important in the 
realm of religion — are genuine states of feeling [...]; whereas the self-approval and 
self-reproach, apart from their subsequently passing into joy and sorrow, belong 
themselves rather to the objective self-consciousness of a self, as results from 
analytic contemplation.71  
 
The Heideggerean contemplative self in the mood of Angst that reproaches its ‗self‘ 
as ‗an improper self‘ precisely because that self can only think of its self as an 
accompanying ‗I think‘ that is already an ‗I‘ that is destined for death, therein annulling 
any grandeur of ontological ownership that such a ‗self‘ may have assumed and 
acquired outside of the mood of Angst, and that very same self that approves of 
itself as ‗a proper self‘ in the ‗I‘ that wills of its self in the mood of Angst to be that 
finite self, for its self, in itself, in anticipatory openness for its own death, come 
what may and ‗without alibi‘, as Sartre puts it, is a result of what Schleiermacher 
terms above, ‗analytic contemplation‘; that is to say, such reflection within Angst 
belongs to a one-sided manner of thinking on experience that accompanies 
objective self-consciousness of a self. This manner of thinking, alas, does not 
disclose any truth of the matter pertaining to one‘s own subjective self-
consciousness of a self, which, as one commentator puts it, is a ‗higher centre of 
consciousness whereby we both remember and desire, and feel guilt or pride at 
what ―I‖ have done or been‘.72 This ‗I‘ is not a mere accompaniment to a series of 
incidents in my physical bodily life, or in my mental life as Plato noted, but as 
Gerard Watson succinctly puts it, ‗a connecting thread‘ wherein the unity and 
continuity of responsibility and accountability for the ‗I‘ is given.73 This ‗I‘, 
nonetheless, is hidden from the ‗I think‘ and the ‗I will‘ that accompanies the 
objectified self in Angst, or, indeed, that accompanies any objectified self in any 
other kind of intellectual or wilful representation, such as, Hume‘s ‗self‘ as ‗a bundle 
or collection of different perceptions‘,74 or Kant‘s ‗I think‘ as ‗an analytic unity of 
apperception‘.75 Yet it is this overlooked ‗I‘, as Plato taught us to see, ‗that provides 
the unity or continuity in personality and so gives meaning to what is otherwise a 
psychic and physical hotch-potch‘.76 And it is this deeper and fixed ‗I‘ that 
 
71 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 7. 
72 Gerard Watson, ‗Plato and the Story‘, in Platonic Investigations, ed. by Dominic J. O‘Meara 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1985), Studies in Philosophy and the History of 
Philosophy Vol. 13, 35–52 (pp. 36–37). 
73 Watson, pp. 36–37. 
74 See, David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, Book I Part 4, Section 6. 
75 See, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B133–4n. For Schleiermacher, both Kant‘s ‗I think‘ qua ‗analytic 
unity of apperception‘ that is constitutive of logical universality (see, §16 of the B edition 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories), as much as Hume‘s famously empirically deduced 
‗self‘ as ‗a bundle of different perceptions‘, as much as Heidegger‘s thinking about ‗the proper self‘ in 
the mood of Angst, would be products of objective self consciousness, overlooking what Plato 
originally spotted about the ‗I‘.  
76 Watson, p. 37. 
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experiences joy and sorrow in its day to day living and that experiences its self as 
embedded in a world wherein everything is indissolubly interconnected that also 
experiences its self in causal dependence upon that which is higher than that self in 
its world.77 It is this experience of the existence of subjective self-consciousness in 
relation to the existence of the infinite that Schleiermacher wishes to draw our 
attention to and identify as the experiential origins, par excellence, of ‗immediate 
religious self-consciousness‘.78  
Drawing attention to the feeling of piety that forms an integral part of the 
dimension of experience that is characteristic of an individual‘s ‗immediate religious 
self-consciousness‘, Schleiermacher remarks, 
 
The common element in all howsoever expressions of piety, by which these are 
conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or in other words, the self-identical 
essence of piety is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which 
is the same thing, of being in relation with God.79 
 
What is of significance here is that this consciousness of being absolutely dependent 
can only be felt and known within particular human experiences as such in 
‗immediate religious self-consciousness‘.80 Yet this particular feeling of innermost 
joy that is found in the discovery of the knowledge of the truth of one‘s own 
existence residing in dependence on the existence of a higher and highest being that 
can only be a higher and highest Good, ‗carries with it‘, as Joseph McBride acutely 
points out, and as Augustine discovered against his own will, ‗that it is God, the 
unmeasured measure or the measureless measure of all measures and not man 
himself who is the measure of man.‘81  And if this is the case, then thinking the 
relation of the finite and the infinite in this direction, with Augustine and 
Schleiermacher, will be a thinking that goes back to the roots of those philosophies 
of experience elaborated by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, but as their ‗norm and 
critical standard‘ precisely because ‗the feeling of absolute dependence‘ is not a 
religious dogma, nor a theological proposition, nor an abstract ahistorical theoretical 
construction, but, as Terence Tice observes, ‗(F)undamentally [...] an experience of 
being utterly dependent, of being interconnected with the whole of the entire 
created and sustained process of nature, including the history of human beings, in 
and through which God‘s grace is made manifest.‘82 
 
77 This concurs with Husserl‘s requirement that such causal dependence between God and the 
existence of one‘s own actual consciousness ‗naturally does not have the sense of a physical-causal 
reason‘ and that God as an Absolute would ‗be an ―absolute‖ in the sense totally different from that which 
consciousness is an absolute [as defined in and through the transcendental reduction] […] just as  it 
would be something transcendent in a sense totally different from that in which world is something 
transcendent [to the harmony of one‘s own outer perceptual-sense experiences]‘. Husserl, Ideas I,‘ 
§58. The Transcendency, God, Excluded‘, pp. 133–134:110–111 (p. 134:111).  
78 See, Terence Tice, Schleiermacher (Nashville: Abdington, 2006), p. 27. 
79 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 12.  
80 This is because ‗no thinking or acting [for Schleiermacher] is affect-free or can be rightly 
conceived as unaffected by feelings of some kind‘. Tice, p. 26.  
81 Joseph McBride, Albert Camus: Philosopher and Littérature (New York: St Martin‘s Press, 1992), pp. 
38–339. If one is unable to find a ‗good‘ (bonum) in the nature of things given to our actual 
experiences, then it goes without saying that one will not be able to find either a higher or highest 
Good (summum Bonum) either. 
82 Tice, pp. 27–28. 
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From this, it follows, then, that the particular experience of absolute 
dependence on the ‗grace‘ of God, however that ‗idea of God‘ is to be interpreted 
and expressed historically in documented evidence about ‗the word of God‘, will 
require not a new science of experience but a renewed and renewable hermeneutic 
retrieval of its significance in and for human historical self-understanding. This, 
however, can only be conducted from within the particular experience and 
conditioning of immediate religious self-consciousness of ‗the [critical] word of 
God‘ itself, as Schleiermacher remarks.83 This applies to anyone living in the wake 
of the Kantian critique, and that extends to and includes not only Husserl and 
Heidegger but also Kant himself. As a member of the Protestant faith, Kant, after 
all, throughout his critical reflections, held firm to his religious conviction that it is 
through ‗faith alone that we see God‘s face‘. In this respect, Kant must take 
reassurance — and re-assurance is an epistemological term — from St John the 
Evangelist‘s remarks that those who lived after Jesus Christ, and believed in his life, 
death and resurrection, are not in any way at a disadvantaged or compromised by 
not being present at the time of his life, death, and resurrection, for, as St John the 
beloved discipline notes, there were many who saw Jesus, and did not believe, even 
after the resurrection appearances (as recounted in the story of doubting Thomas). 
Viewed in this light, it is not an irrefragable item of knowledge about the life, death 
and resurrection (i.e., facticity) of Jesus Christ that counts for Kant, but the testimony 
of the written word of the Old and New Testaments and faith in ‗the word of God‘ that 
is Kant‘s first and final court of appeal. This is why outside of faith in the word of 
God, we have no way of knowing, according to Kant, whether the God we believe 
in exists, or not. And this is why, for Kant, inside the realm of personal faith in 
God, the same ‗objective uncertainty‘ (as Kierkegaard later expresses it) in relation 
to (demonstrable) knowledge of the existence of God equally holds. In other words, for 
Kant, as a man of faith, the non-existence of God must be a real possibility, and not 
just a merely formal-logical possibility containing nothing self-referentially 
inconsistent for anyone to assert the proposition ‗God does not exist‘, in order for 
belief, as Kant understands it, to be what it is, belief in God. From this, it clearly 
follows for Kant that if we believe in God, we cannot know in any apodictic manner that 
God exists. This is why Kant is quite correct to impress and to stress to his readers 
in the 1787 Preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, that he had to 
remove apodictic knowledge-claims in relation to the existence of God ‗in order to 
make room for belief in the existence of God]‘ (a belief that his moral argument for 
the existence of God renders highly equivocal).84 This, however, is an expressly 
religious reason, on Kant‘s part, for curtailing any path of thinking that would lead 
to an inappropriate manner of thinking, philosophically or theologically, about the 
existence of God in relation to the experiencing subject. This leaves unthought 
(ungedacht), nonetheless, the task of doing just that, appropriately: thinking 
(philosophically or theologically) the existence of God in relation to the existence of 
 
83  ‗If, however, word and idea are always originally one, and the term ―God‖ therefore presupposes 
an idea, then we shall simply say that this idea, which is nothing more than an expression of the 
feeling of absolute dependence, is the most direct reflection upon it and the most original idea with 
which we are here concerned, and is quite independent of original knowledge (properly so called), 
and conditioned only by our feeling of absolute dependence.‘ Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 
17. 
84 I would like to thank the reviewer of my article for drawing my attention to this significant 
equivocity in Kant‘s treatment of historical religions (especially those claiming revelation). 
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the self, just as Schleiermacher had argued. That there is a particular religious 
experience and religious reasoning concerning the existence of the self in relation to 
the existence of God in the identity of the human self in religious self-
consciousness underpinning Kantian epistemology, Husserlian phenomenology, 
and Heideggerean thinking on finitude, therefore, cannot be doubted.85 The task, 
however, is to think this and its significance both after Kant and against Kant, after 
Husserl and against Husserl, after Heidegger and against Heidegger.86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 That there is also a legitimate form of religious thinking, after Kant, as evidenced in the writings of 
Kierkegaard, is something that cannot be doubted, nor written out of the history of thought, as it is 
by Heidegger, in his three footnote references to Kierkegaard‘s thought in Being and Time. 
86 This article is a revised version of a paper that I first prepared for and gave at a Conference on 
theme of ‗The Grandeur of Reason,‘ held in Rome (3 Sept. 2008), under the auspices of The Centre 
of Theology and Philosophy, University of Nottingham, U.K., and which I later re-worked and read 
at the Irish Philosophical Society‘s 2009 Autumn Conference, held in St Malachy‘s College, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland (24 October). I would like to thank Dr Fáinche Ryan and Dr Janet Soskice for 
their follow-up discussion on this paper in Rome and the participants at the Irish Philosophical 
Society‘s Conference for their questions in Belfast. I would also like to thank Haydn Gurmin and 
Denise Ryan, postgraduate students of the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, for reading 
drafts of this paper and giving me their comments. Any misunderstanding of the topic, of course, is 
entirely my own. 
